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So the most straightforward, and,
arguably, robust way to use the yield
curve is to use the statistical relationship
between its slope and future economic
growth, and then look where the current
yield curve is pointing. This approach
requires choosing first a specific spread
to use as a measure of the yield curve’s
slope, and then choosing a measure 
of output. One of the most reliable 
and most often watched spreads is the
one between 10-year U.S. Treasury
bonds and 3-month T-bills. The natural
and probably the most popular choice
for growth is real GDP growth, taken 
at a quarterly or on a year-over-year
basis, and predicting out one year 
(four quarters).
For the week of March 10, 2006, the
spread stood at –13 basis points, so this
approach predicts real GDP growth over
the next four quarters of 2.12 percent.
Using a different spread (such as the 10-
year minus the 2-year spread) or a dif-
ferent measure of output would give
similar results. 
This yield-spread prediction can be seen
as pessimistic, as it is well below the
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Experience has taught economic fore-
casters to expect a recession when the
yield on short-term Treasury securi-
ties rises above the yield on longer-
term securities—a situation known 
as a yield-curve inversion. But some
economists suspect the yield curve
might not be as reliable a predictor 
of output growth as it used to be.
P redicting the future has always fasci-
nated humans, and economic forecasting
doubles the interest by adding a chance
to turn a profit. One popular forecasting
tool—the yield curve—has made head-
lines lately because it may be predicting
a recession. Though traditionally among
the most accurate of economic forecast-
ing instruments, the yield curve is at
odds with many other current predic-
tions. So what is this yield curve, in
what sense is it predicting a recession,
and why are others skeptical of this 
prediction? 
■ Bonds, Yields, and Maturity
The U.S. Treasury issues many types of
debt, from short-term to long-term. You
can buy Treasury bonds that mature in
three months or in thirty years, and 
quite a few in between. You can buy
them straight from the Treasury or from 
others who are selling ones they bought
from the Treasury. The interest rate on
the bonds that is relevant to the yield
curve is the “yield to maturity” or just
“yield,” which accounts for both the
coupon payments from the bonds and
the price you paid for the bond. The
yield curve simply plots the yield on 
the bond against its time to maturity.
Usually, the yield curve slopes up:
longer-term bonds have higher yields
than do short-term bonds, as people feel
those longer-term bonds have more risk,
requiring a higher return. Put differently,
the spread (difference) between any
given long rate and a short rate is usually
positive. When short rates rise above
long rates, the yield curve is said to be
inverted (and the spread is negative). 
As figure 1 shows, since 1960, the yield
curve has inverted seven times, and 
in six of those times a recession has 
followed in short order. The yield curve
has inverted recently, sending both the 
10-year minus the 2-year and the 10-
year minus the 3-month spreads nega-
tive, and generating disagreement about
whether the inversion signals a recession
or not. In the past several months, a vari-
ety of Federal Reserve officials, market
gurus, and general prognosticators have
weighed in on the issue, a good many of
them concluding it unlikely that the cur-
rent inversion signals an incipient reces-
sion. So how concerned should we be
about the inversion? To answer this, it is
best to examine what the yield curve is
predicting at this point in time and to
consider the reasons we may have for
doubting its prediction.
■ What Does the Yield
Curve Predict?
Yield curve predictions about future
growth come in two general flavors. One
tries to predict the rate of growth that can
be expected at some point in the future,
the other tries to predict the probability
of a recession occurring. 
The first uses a term spread to predict
future output, usually at a horizon of two,
four, or six quarters. This approach has
an advantage in that it reveals more of the
information that is in the yield curve.
Inversions are not the curve’s only signal:
While negative spreads precede negative
growth, positive spreads precede positive
growth. In general, the steeper the curve,
the higher the expected growth. This
observation holds true both over time and
across countries, and while most investi-
gations have concentrated on the post–
World War II period, some evidence has
shown the yield curve predicts output
since 1875 in the United States and since
1870 in Germany.probability of recession at 38 percent.
Since 1960, the economy has been in a
recession 14 percent of the time. So
while not predicting a recession for sure,
the yield curve indicates that the odds are
substantially greater than average. 
■ Do We Have Reason to
Doubt the Yield Curve’s 
Predictions?
Despite the evidence linking the yield
curve to economic growth, and even
though yield-curve inversions preceded
the two most recent recessions, many
have suggested that the yield curve no
longer reliably predicts economic
growth. Noting that the economy is con-
tinually evolving, particularly the finan-
cial sector, they discount past successes.
They point to two recent “near misses”
in 1995 and 1998, when a flat yield
curve did not presage slow growth. And
indeed, evidence since the early 1990s
suggests that the relationship between
the yield curve and growth has shifted, if
not disappeared.
Thus, some people argue that it is inap-
propriate to use data before 1990 to
measure the connection between the
yield curve and economic growth. Even
using this more modern sample, though,
the yield curve’s predictions have not
fallen in line with the consensus. Using
the shorter sample, the analysis predicts
growth of 2.45 percent, higher than
before, but still below the consensus
estimate. Using data since 1990 to pre-
dict the probability of recession results
in a recession probability of 55 percent,
even higher than the previous estimate
of 38 percent.
Recent data, then, although perhaps
indicating a different relationship
between the yield curve and growth, still
points to slower growth and a nontrivial
chance of recession, and so by itself
does little to impugn the yield curve’s
record. However, those expressing
doubts about predictions from the yield
curve have some more specific reasons
for their skepticism. 
When describing why he thought the
yield curve should be interpreted care-
fully, Alan Greenspan noted the flat
curve in 1992–94, but also stressed
another factor. Greenspan argued that
“the key component from which the
yield curve slope derives much of its
predictive power for future GDP
growth” is “the gap between the current
and long-run levels of the real federal



















1967 1970 1973 1982 1979 1976 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006
Standard deviation
Core PCE
FIGURE 2 INFLATION VARIABILITY
SOURCE: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and author’s calculations.
consensus forecast of 3.0 percent, but it
still indicates positive growth, not a
recession. Actually, while this
approach is quite good at telling you
whether growth will be above or below
average, it is not so good at predicting
the exact number. It might tell you to
expect below-average growth, but it
seldom tells you that the economy will
actually shrink. That is, it rarely pre-
dicts the negative growth characteristic
of recessions and, conversely, rarely
predicts the strong growth usually seen
at the start of expansions. 
For that reason, forecasters who want to
be more certain about detecting an
upcoming recession prefer a more direct
approach. Rather than trying to predict
actual GDP numbers, they prefer to
focus on predicting the discrete event of
whether the economy will be in a reces-
sion or not. 
Using a different statistical procedure,
one economists call a probit, we can
use the 10-year minus the 3-month
spread to find the current probability of
a recession. Given the yield curve as of
March 9, 2006, this approach puts the
NOTE: The yield spread is the 10-year Treasury note minus the 3-month Treasury bill.
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis; and Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System, “Selected Interest Rates,” Federal Reserve Statistical
Releases, H:15.funds rate.” That is, when the real fed-
eral funds rate—the target rate set by
the FOMC, adjusted for inflation—is
high relative to its long-run level, the
chance of a recession increases. While
Greenspan does not cite the statistical
analysis he refers to, there is some 
evidence that movements in short-term
rates account for much of the yield
curve’s predictive ability.
The relationship Greenspan refers to
can be applied to give another approach
to using the yield curve to predict reces-
sions. It provides a more optimistic
assessment of GDP growth. Using data
since 1960 on the gap between the real
fed funds rate and its long-term average
results in a prediction of 3.6 percent
growth over the next four quarters;
using data since 1989 gives a prediction
of 3.0 percent growth.
The other reason often cited for why the
yield curve inversion may not mean a
recession is the Fed’s credibility in the
fight against inflation. In one version of
this argument, long-term rates are low,
not only because expectations of infla-
tion are low, but because the risk of
inflation (inflation variability) is also
low. Not only is the market’s best guess
that inflation will be low, but the market
thinks it quite unlikely that its guess
will be off by much.
As figure 2 makes clear, inflation vari-
ability has dropped quite dramatically
since 1989–90. This fall in variability
most likely results in a reduced infla-
tion-risk premium for long bonds,
which lowers long-term interest rates.
Economists at both Goldman Sachs
and Deutsche Bank suggest that this is
the key to low long-term rates, and the
key to understanding why the inversion
does not signal a recession. Roughly
speaking, in the old days, fears of infla-
tion meant the yield curve was steep,
and investors demanded high rates to
protect themselves against inflation. A
yield curve inversion, then, meant that
short-term rates had moved up a lot.
And those high short rates signaled, or
even caused, a recession. Now, with a
credible Fed and a low risk premium,
an inversion only signals moderately
high short rates, and thus less risk 
of recession. 
A related reason also looks to the
increase in Fed credibility, but empha-
sizes reductions in the persistence,
rather than in the variability of inflation
(though clearly the two can be related).
In this work, a more credible regime
means less persistent inflation: The Fed
stops inflation quickly once it starts, and
so inflation is only temporarily high. In
a less credible regime, once high infla-
tion begins, it stays around, and the
monetary authority does little or nothing
to stop it. 
In the case of the less credible regime,
inflation shocks will tend to shift up
both short- and long-term interest rates,
as inflation feeds through to both. 
Thus, with persistent inflation, nominal
shocks don’t shift the yield curve’s
slope very much—both long and short
rates move together. Now suppose that
these inflationary expectations aren’t
the part of the yield curve that predicts
real activity. That is, the real part of the
yield curve, interest rates adjusted for
inflation, is what predicts real activity.
Then, under a less credible regime,
nominal shocks don’t distort the curva-
ture of the yield spread, and inversions
can signal recessions.
Under a credible regime, with low per-
sistence of inflation, it is a different mat-
ter. In this case, an inflation shock will
increase short rates, but not long rates,
because long-term expectations of infla-
tion don’t change. Thus a nominal
shock twists the yield curve, distorting
the message of the underlying real
curve. This pattern seems to hold—at
least for the United States; times of high
inflation persistence are also times when
the yield curve predicts well. In times of
low persistence (like in the present,
credible regime), the yield curve does
less well. 
■ Still Worth a Look
Economists do not currently have a
well-accepted theory of why the yield
curve predicts future economic growth.
Given that, speculating on whether or
not the yield curve is truly predicting a
recession remains exactly that: specula-
tion. Using the yield curve remains an
exercise in judgment that requires 
balancing the long, successful history
of the yield curve’s predictive power
with some recent evidence of its fading
foresight. It also requires judgment
because predictions of real activity 
represent only one facet of the problem
facing the FOMC: Inflation is the other.
Still, as the Committee becomes more
familiar with the risk-management
approach to policymaking, it seems that
the signal from the yield curve deserves
some weight.
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